Michigan Bankruptcy Blog
On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.
Case Background
The City of Chicago (the “City”) impounded respondents’ vehicles for failure to pay fines for motor vehicle infractions. Thereafter, each respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and requested the return of their vehicle. The City refused to return the vehicles, and the bankruptcy court in each case found the City’s refusal to be a violation of automatic stay. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that by retaining possession of the debtors’ vehicles after they declared bankruptcy, the City had acted “to exercise control over” the debtors’ property in violation of the automatic stay.
A party who believes that a bankruptcy court erred in either granting or denying relief from the automatic stay needs to act fast to appeal such a decision. In the recently decided case of Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court held that: “[A]djudication of a motion for relief from the automatic stay forms a discrete procedural unit within the embracive bankruptcy case” which “yields a final, appealable order when the bankruptcy court unreservedly grants or denies relief.”
For many, the term “debt collection” calls to mind threatening letters and harassing, late-night phone calls. There’s no doubt that many debt collection practices involve aggressive and unseemly tactics used to collect credit card and other unpaid debts, and, as a result, Congress stepped in to curb these practices by passing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).
On June 4, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, No. 16-1215, which dealt with the dischargeability of debt in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court held that a statement about a single asset can be a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” under section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Two years have passed since the United States Supreme Court passed down a 5-4 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges which held that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in PEM Entities v. Levin to decide whether bankruptcy courts should apply a federal multi-factor test or an underlying state law when deciding whether to re-characterize a debt claim as equity. The Court’s decision to grant cert in this case should resolve a circuit split and clarify the law as it relates to re-characterizing corporate debt as equity.
What happens in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case when a creditor files a proof of claim involving a debt for which the statute of limitations to collect the debt has run? More specifically, does the filing of such a claim violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “Act”)? That’s the issue considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in its recent decision in the case of Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson. 1
On May 16, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz[1], ruling that the term “actual fraud” in section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code includes forms of fraud that do not involve a fraudulent misrepresentation.
In this case, Husky International Electronics, Inc. sold products to and was owed money by Chrysalis Manufacturing Corporation. Daniel Ritz, one of the owners of Chrysalis, transferred money from Chrysalis to other entities that he owned, draining Chrysalis of its assets and making it impossible for Chrysalis to pay its debts owed to Husky and other creditors.
Students have taken on more than $1 trillion in debt to pay for the relentlessly rising costs of higher education. With that much debt outstanding, it’s no surprise that there are increasing numbers of borrowers defaulting on student loan debt, and seeking to discharge that debt by filing for bankruptcy protection. But, as a Wisconsin man recently learned, discharging student loan debt in bankruptcy is no easy feat.
On June 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court decided Bank of America v. Caulkett, No. 13-1421, together with Bank of America v. Toledo-Cardona, No. 14-163, holding unanimously that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtor cannot “strip off” a junior lien.
Lien stripping takes place when there are two or more liens on a property, and the senior lien is “underwater” in that the amount owed on the senior lien is greater than the value of the property. In a Chapter 13 case a property owner can strip off the junior lien, resulting in it being treated as unsecured debt in the bankruptcy.
In these cases, the Court held that a Chapter 7 debtor may not void a junior lien under 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) when the debt owed on a senior lien exceeds the current value of the collateral if the junior creditor’s claim is both secured by a lien and allowed under § 502 of the Bankruptcy Code.
On May 4, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, No. 14-116, a case which deals with issues of finality and appealability of orders in bankruptcy proceedings. In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that a bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of a Chapter 13 debtor’s proposed repayment plan is not a final order and thus is not immediately appealable.
When an individual contemplates filing for bankruptcy protection, he or she has a few options. One is to file a Chapter 7 case, and another is to file a Chapter 13 case. In a Chapter 7, all of a debtor’s non-exempt assets are transferred to a bankruptcy estate to be liquidated and distributed to creditors. In a Chapter 13, the debtor retains assets and makes payments to creditors according to a court-approved plan.
On Monday, November 17, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear two bankruptcy-related cases that involve issues commonly faced by banks and homeowners with underwater mortgages in Chapter 7 cases. The cases of Bank of America v. Caulkett and Bank of America v. Toledo-Cardona come from Florida, where many homeowners own homes with mortgages that exceed equity value due to the recent housing crisis. Bank of America holds the second mortgage in both cases.
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court (the “Court”) issued its noteworthy decision in Stern v. Marshall,1 in which it held that bankruptcy courts lack the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not related to the bankruptcy proceeding. Since Stern, a number of cases have been published - at both the bankruptcy court and court of appeals levels - where Stern jurisdictional issues have been raised and adjudicated. We recently wrote about one on this blog.
The Court, itself, had a chance to consider the implications of Stern in the case of Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson.2 In a unanimous decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that where Article III of the U.S. Constitution does not permit a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on a bankruptcy related claim, the bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the claim, to be reviewed de novo by a federal district court.
In Law v. Siegel, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in March, the Court unanimously ruled that the bankruptcy court exceeded its authority when it surcharged the debtor’s homestead exemption to pay the Chapter 7 Trustee’s attorney fees, despite the debtor’s misconduct.
The case involved Stephen Law, a consumer debtor who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in California. Law's only significant asset was his house, worth approximately $360,000. Law exempted $75,000 of the home equity under the state homestead exemption. Law further claimed that there was no additional equity in the house because it was subject to two mortgages totaling up to more than $300,000 — more than the nonexempt value of the house. The first mortgage was real. The second mortgage, allegedly in favor of "Lin's Mortgage & Associates,” was fake. Law was perpetrating a fraud. Alfred Siegel, the Chapter 7 Trustee, uncovered the mortgage scam. Unfortunately, in the process, the trustee incurred approximately $500,000 in legal fees.
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court provided guidance relating to the term “defalcation” of the Bankruptcy Code under Section 523(a)(4).1 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the term “defalcation” of the Bankruptcy Code includes a “culpable state of mind requirement involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the fiduciary behavior.”
In a recent opinion, the Sixth Circuit has provided clarification of Stern v. Marshall's1 holding by analyzing Article III “judicial power,” the pubic rights doctrine, and the bankruptcy court's authority.
In Waldman, the Western District of Kentucky Bankruptcy Court entered a judgment against the principal creditor after finding that the creditor had defrauded the debtor and had acquired nearly all of the debtor’s assets by means of fraud. The Bankruptcy Court entered a judgment discharging the debts the debtor owed the creditor and awarded the debtor a judgment of more than $3 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The creditor appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of a final judgment based upon three challenges: (1) the debtor’s state law fraud claims are beyond the jurisdiction of the federal court; (2) the judgment entered was beyond the statutory authority of the bankruptcy court; and (3) the judgment was beyond the bankruptcy court’s power pursuant to Article III of the Constitution.
This blog entry includes material originally prepared by the author for the 2012 FBA Bankruptcy Seminar.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), immediately cast a shadow of uncertainty on bankruptcy courts’ constitutional authority to enter final orders. But Stern leaves many questions unanswered, and the bankruptcy judges within the Western District of Michigan have differed as to whether the case should be interpreted narrowly or broadly. As a result, depending on the presiding judge in a particular case, Stern may be critically important or unworthy of mentioning. The following is a brief review of cases in this district that address the scope of Stern.
Many are familiar with Anna Nicole Smith, the late television personality who married an elderly oil tycoon shortly before his death and later became embroiled in a legal battle over his estate. Recently, the bankruptcy case of Vickie Lynn Marshall – Anna Nicole Smith's legal name – made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court and resulted in an opinion that limits the authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final orders in common law actions.
Vickie married J. Howard Marshall approximately a year before his death, and although he gave her many gifts, he did not leave her anything in his will. Before J. Howard passed away, Vickie sued his son, Pierce, in state probate court for tortious interference with J. Howard's will. Vickie then filed bankruptcy. Pierce filed a nondischargeability action and a proof of claim in Vickie's bankruptcy case, asserting that Vickie had defamed him. Vickie filed a counterclaim against Pierce, essentially restating the tort allegations from her state probate court action.
Ransom v FIA Card Services, NA, Supreme Court of the United States, Jan. 11, 2011 (Case No. 09-907).
In the first opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a Chapter 13 debtor who owns a vehicle outright and thus does not make loan or lease payments cannot include vehicle ownership costs in his or her monthly expenses for purpose of the means test.
Under BAPCPA, debtors in Chapter 13 cases must follow a formula to calculate their disposable income - that is, the amount that the debtor must use to pay creditors under a court-approved Chapter 13 plan. To determine disposable income, the debtor deducts certain "reasonably necessary" expenses from his or her monthly income. Those reasonably necessary expenses, which are outlined in the IRS's "National and Local Standards," include allowances for vehicle ownership and operating costs.
In re Peckens-Schmitt, Bankr. W.D. Mich., July 16, 2010 (Case No. 10-04164, Hon. Scott W. Dales).
In a notable decision, the United States Supreme Court recently upheld a bankruptcy court's confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan that discharged part of a student loan debt without an adversary proceeding where the student loan creditor had notice of the plan but did not object. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010).
